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Abstract
Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings, Simko, and Thompson (1996) document a
negative association between a firm's last-in, first-out (LIFO) reserve and the market value
of its equity. In this paper, we test a deferred tax explanation of this negative association.
Specifically, we argue that investors, conditional on adjusting inventory to as-if first-in,
first-out (FIFO), estimate a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden as its LIFO reserve
multiplied by the appropriate corporate tax rate and include this tax-adjusted LIFO reserve
in the valuation of a LIFO firm's net assets. On the basis of this argument, the tax-adjusted
LIFO reserve is in effect an estimate of an off-balance-sheet deferred tax liability and, as
a result, we predict a negative association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and
market value of equity. We test our deferred tax explanation by estimating a valuation
model in which a firm's market value of equity is expressed as a function of the firm's
assets, liabilities, deferred tax liability, and tax-adjusted LIFO reserve; the model is esti-
mated separately in years preceding and following the reduction of tax rates mandated by
the US Tax Reform Act of 1986. Test results provide strong support for the deferred tax
explanation of the negative association between a firm's LIFO reserve and the market
value of its equity.
Condense
Guenther et Trombley (1994) ainsi que Jennings, Simko et Thompson (1996) constatent
une association negative entre la reserve d'epuisement k rebours (reserve DEPS — dernier
cnti6, premier sorti) d'une entreprise et la valeur de march6 de son avoir des actionnaires,
et une association moins negative dans le cas des entreprises qui sont davantage capables
de r6percuter les hausses de prix des intrants sur le pdx des extrants. Selon Guenther et
Trombley ainsi que Jennings et al., ces resultats corroborent la conclusion selon Iaquelle
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les investisseurs s'attendent h ce qu'en moyenne, les entreprises soient incapables d'aug-
menter leurs prix de vente, tout au moins dollar pour dollar, en rdponse aux hausses de prix
des intrants.
Les auteurs ont ici pour but de verifier s'il est possible d'expliquer par les imp6ts
reportds l'association negative entre la reserve DEPS et la valeur de march6 de l'avoir des
actionnaires. Avant de ddcrire cette explication possible par les impdts report^s, il convient
de noter que l'dcart entre le coOt des stocks 6tabli selon la mdthode de l'fipuisement suc-
cessif (PEPS — premier entre, premier sorti) et leur cout d6clar6, 6tabli selon la m6thode
DEPS (soit la r6serve DEPS) est habituellement consid6re conime un actif non comptabilisd
puisque le coflt PEPS se rapproche davantage du coiit de remplacement que le coOt DEPS.
Les auteurs ne sont pas en disaccord avec cette optique et s'attendent h ce que les in-
vestisseurs convertissent les stocks DEPS i leur valeur PEPS simul6e lorsqu'ils dvaluent les
actifs nets d'une entreprise qui applique la m6thode DEPS.
Si les investisseurs effectuent cet ajustement, les auteurs s'attendent ^ ce que ceux-ci
reconnaissent dgalement l'existence d'un passif d'impots report6s Ii6 aux stocks, 6gal h la
r6serve DEPS multipli6e par le taux d'imposition des socidtds appropri6, dans revaluation
des actifs nets d'une entreprise qui applique la m6thode DEPS. Techniquement, ce passif
d'impots report6s d^coule du fait que les investisseurs, en convertissant les stocks h leur
valeur PEPS simul6e, supposent implicitement que l'entreprise applique la mdthode PEPS
aux fins d'information financifere et la m^thode DEPS aux fins fiscales. Plus intuitivement.
Ton pourrait attribuer l'existence de ce passif d'impots report6s au fait que l'utilisation de
la m^thode DEPS donne lieu h un report d'impots temporaire, par rapport k l'utilisation de
la mdthode PEPS, qui s'inverse lorsque les tranches de stock constitutes servent k r^pondre
k la demande. Le passif d'imp6ts reportds ddcrit ici est souvent d6sign6 sous l'appellation
de fardeau fiscal de l'entreprise resultant de la liquidation future des tranches de stock
constitutes. Dans ce sc6nario, la rdserve DEPS r6duite k son incidence flscale est, en fait,
une estimation du passif d'imp6ts reportds hors bilan. En consequence, les auteurs pr^voient
une association ndgative entre la reserve DEPS r6duite k son incidence fiscale et la valeur
de march6 de l'avoir des actionnaires, ce qu'ils appellent dans leur 6tude r« explication par
les impots reportds de l'association negative entre la reserve DEPS et la valeur de march6
de l'avoir des actionnaires ».
A1'aide d'un 6chantillon de 11617 annfes-entrepdses qui appliquent la mdthode DEPS
s'^chelonnant de 1975 k 1994, les auteurs testent l'explication par les impots reportds de
l'association n6gative entre la rdserve DEPS et la valeur de march6 de l'avoir des action-
naires en estimant le module suivant pour toutes les entreprises et chacune des anndes de
rechantillon (les signes prdvus des coefficients du mod^e figurent entre crochets):
ou i designe l'entreprise, t, l'exercice courant, MV, la valeur de marchd des actions
ordinaires au terme du quatrifeme mois suivant la fin de l'exercice t, ASSETS, la valeur
comptable des actifs autres que les stocks au terme de l'exercice t, INV, les stocks k leur
valeur PEPS simul6e au terme de l'exercice t, LIAB, la valeur comptable des passifs autres
I que le DTL, additionnde des actions privildgides au terme de l'exercice t, RESV, la reserve
DEPS ramende k un montant d'impots reportds au terme de l'exercice t, DTL, le passif
d'impots reportds au terme de l'exercice t et ABIL*RESV, une mesure de la capacitd de
rdpercuter les hausses de prix des intrants en interaction avec la rdserve DEPS brute. Pour
rdduire les effets de taille, les 616ments de la matrice de donndes sont ddflatds des actions
ordinaires en circulation.
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Dans le modele, les stocks figurent h leur valeur PEPS simulfe pour tenir compte de
la provision des auteurs selon laquelle les investisseurs convertissent les stocks DEPS a leur
valeur PEPS simulde lorsqu'ils 6valuent les actifs nets d'une entreprise qui applique la
methode DEPS. La reserve DEPS est ramen^e h un montant d'impots report6s de mani^re
k tenir compte de la prevision des auteurs selon laquelle les investisseurs, sous reserve de
la conversion des stocks a leur valeur PEPS simul6e, considferent la reserve DBPS ramende
k un montant d'impots reportes comme un indicateur du fardeau fiscal resultant de la
liquidation future des tranches de stock constitutes, lorsqu'ils evaluent les actifs nets d'une
entreprise qui applique la methode DEPS. Les auteurs incluent le solde du passif d'impots
reportds dans l'dquation (1) parce qu'ils peuvent ainsi comparer l'association reserve DEPS
reduite a son incidence flscaleA>aleur de marche de I'avoir des actionnaires avec l'asso-
ciation passif d'impots reportes/valeur de marche de I'avoir des actionnaires.
La Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) ramenait en deux ans le taux d'imposition
maximum des socidt6s de 46 k 34 pour cent. Conform^ment aux regies de comptabilit6
gen6rale en vigueur au moment de l'adoption de la TRA 86, les entreprises n'ajustaient pas
leur passif d'impots reportds pour tenir compte de la reduction des taux d'imposition exigds
par la TRA 86. Done, la diminution dans les taux exig6s par la TRA 86 r6duirait la valeur
rdelle tant du passif d'impots report^s au bilan que le passif d'impots reportds hors bilan
6valu6 approximativement par la reserve DEPS r6duite k son incidence fiscale, du fait que
ce passif serait 6ventuellement r6gl6 i 34 pour cent plutot que 46 pour cent. En consdquence,
le coefficient de la variable RESV, si les investisseurs consid^rent la reserve DEPS rdduite
k son incidence fiscale comme un indicateur du fardeau fiscal de l'entreprise resultant de la
liquidation DEPS future, et le coefficient de la variable DTL devraient etre tous deux moins
negatifs dans les estimations de l'dquation (1) post6rieures k la TRA 86.
Afln de tester la provision qui pr6c6de, les auteurs estiment l'Squation (1) pour toutes
les entreprises et chacune des onze ann^es de l'dchantillon antdrieures k la TRA 86 (soit
1975 k 1985) ainsi que pour toutes les entreprises et chacune des huit ann6es de l'^chantillon
post^rieures k la TRA 86 (soit 1987 k 1994). Conform6ment au pronostic, les coefficients
estim^s des variables RESV et DTL sont g6n6ralement negatifs, et les moyennes des
coefficients estimes posterieurs k la TRA 86 pour les variables RESVet DTL sont beaucoup
moins negatives que les moyennes des coefficients estim6s ant6rieurs k la TRA 86. De plus,
le coefficient de la variable DTL ne differe pas du coefficient de la variable RESV aux seuils
de signification habituels dans 12 des 19 estimations de 1'Equation (1), et la moyenne des
19 coefficients estimds de la variable DTL ne difffere pas de la moyenne des 19 coefficients
estimds de la variable RESV aux seuils de signification habituels. La similarit6 de l'im-
portance des coefficients estimes des variables RESV et DTL, en conjonction avec la
similarity des reactions a la TRA 86 de l'association reserve DEPS reduite a son incidence
ftscalefyaleur de marche de I'avoir des actionnaires et de l'association passif d'impots
reportdsAaleurde marche de I'avoir des actionnaires, confirme l'explication paries impots
reportds de l'association negative entre la reserve DEPS et la valeur de march6 de I'avoir
des actionnaires.
Guenther et Trombley (1994) et Jennings et al. (1996) 61aborent un argument d'61as-
ticit6-prix en vertu duquel l'association negative entre la reserve DEPS et la valeur de
marche de 1' avoir des actionnaires est interpr6t6e comme une indication que les investisseurs
s'attendent k ce qu'en moyenne, les entreprises ne puissent hausser le prix des extrants, tout
au moins dollar pour dollar, en r^ponse aux hausses de prix des intrants. Pour tenir compte
de l'argument d'61asticit6-prix, l'^quation (1) inclut une variable, ABIL*RESV, qui mesure
la capacity de l'entreprise k rdpercuter les hausses de prix des intrants, apr^s le controle de
la taille de sa reserve DEPS, cette capacity 6tant assimil6e k la correlation, pour l'ensemble
de la p^riode 6tudi6e, entre le profit brut annuel de l'entreprise en pourcentage des ventes
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et le niveau de l'indice des prix k la consommation k la fin de l'exercice. Les r6sultats des
tests appliques k la variable ABIL*RESV corroborent les resultats dont font 6tat Guenther
et Trombley ainsi que Jennings et al.
Les auteurs testent trois explications possibles de la constatation selon laquelle le
coefficient de la variable RESV est moins n^gatif dans les estimations de l'dquation (1)
post6rieures k la TRA 86. PremiSrement, un virage stnicturel dans revaluation des actifs et
des passifs au cours de la periode post6rieure k la TRA 86 est possible, ce qui pourrait
expliquer les r^sultats relatifs aux variables RESVet DTL. Les auteurs constatent cependant
que, bien que I'association de chacune des variables RESV et DTL avec la variable MV soit
devenue moins negative dans les ann6es postdrieures k la TRA 86, la reaction k la TRA 86
a 6t6 non significative ou moins prononc^e pour les variables ASSETS, INVet UAB. fitant
donnd qu'une association moins negative entre une variable donn6e et la variable MV en
reaction k la reduction des taux d'imposition exig6s par la TRA 86 n'est pr^vue que pour les
variables RESVet DTL, ces resultats demontrent indirectement que la valeur de l'avoir des
actionnaires est sensible aux variations des taux d'imposition. Deuxifemement, compte tenu
de la tendance de l'inflation au cours de la p6riode de rSchantillon, Ton s'attendait sans
doute k une inflation plus faible au cours de la periode post6rieure k la TRA 86. Si la
probability d'inflation r6duit la valeur de marche de l'avoir des actionnaires et si le
coefficient de la variable /?£5Vreflete la probability d'inflation, l'autre explication de la
diminution du coefficient de la variable RESV aprts la TRA 86 serait alors la reduction de
l'inflation prevue au cours de la p6riode posterieure a la TRA 86. Toutefois, les resultats des
tests portant uniquement sur les annees de faible inflation donnent k penser que les
provisions d'inflation rdduite au cours de la p6riode postOrieure k la TRA 86 n'expliquent
pas la diminution du coefficient de la variable RESV postOrieure k la TRA 86. Troisie-
mement, il semble vraisemblable que les benOfices d'une entreprise soient en corrOlation
avec sa capacitO de repercuter les hausses de prix des inu^ants. Par exemple, une entreprise
qui Oprouve de la difficult^ k rOpercuter les hausses de prix des intrants devrait enregistrer
des bOnOfices plus faibles, toutes proportions gardees. Les b6n6fices etant un facteur
important dans revaluation de l'avoir des actionnaires d'une entreprise, cette supposition
souleve la possibility que I'association negative entre les variables MV et RESV, dans la
mesure oCi elle reflate l'incapacitO de rOpercuter les hausses de prix des intrants, traduise, en
fait, la variable corrOlee omise des benOfices. Or, lorsque les auteurs estiment un module
d'Ovaluation qui englobe les bOnOfices de l'entreprise k titre de variable indOpendante, ils
obtiennent des rOsultats qui appuient toujours I'explication par les impots reportOs de I'asso-
ciation nOgative entre la rOserve DEPS et la valeur de marchO de l'avoir des actionnaires.
La prOsente Otude a pour principale richesse de contribuer a expliquer I'association
nOgative imprOvue ex ante entre la rOserve DEPS et la valeur de marchO de l'avoir des
actionnaires et, ce faisant, d'aider k clarifier la nature de 1'information foumie par une
donnOe importante prOsentOe sous forme de note complOmentaire : la rOserve DEPS. Les
rOsultats de l'Otude offrent Ogalement plusieurs renseignements prOcieux aux analystes
financiers et aux chercheurs qui s'intOressent a l'analyse de la fiscalitO et des Otats financiers.
Premierement, ils confirment les conclusions voulant que la prOsentation de la rOserve DEPS
soit utile parce qu'elle livre de l'information relative au fardeau fiscal de l'entreprise.
Deuxiemement, conformOment aux recherches prOalables, les rOsultats de la prOsente Otude
dOmontrent que les investisseurs considdrent les impots reportOs comme de vOritables passifs
qui rOduisent la valeur de marchO de l'avoir des actionnaires de l'entreprise. Enfm, ces
rOsultats prouvent indirectement que la valeur de l'avoir des actionnaires est sensible aux
changements des taux d'imposition exigOs par la loi.
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1. Introduction
Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings, Simko, and Thompson (1996)
document a negative association between a firm's last-in, first-out (LIFO) reserve
and the market value of its equity, with a less negative association observed for
firms that are better able to pass on input price increases to their customers.'
Guenther and Trombley and Jennings et al. interpret their results as consistent with
the conclusion that investors expect that firms on average are unable to raise prices
at least dollar for dollar in response to input price increases.
The purpose of this paper is to test a deferred tax explanation of the negative
association between the LIFO reserve and market value of equity. Before we de-
scribe the deferred tax explanation, we should first note that the difference between
first-in, first-out (FIFO) cost of inventory and its reported LIFO cost (i.e., the LIFO
reserve) is typically viewed as an unrecorded asset because, relative to LIFO cost,
FIFO cost is closer to replacement cost (e.g.. White, Sondhi, and Fried 1998). We
do not disagree with this view and we expect that investors adjust LIFO inventory
to as-if FIFO when valuing a LIFO firm's net assets.
If investors do adjust a LIFO firm's inventory to as-if FIFO, then we expect
that investors also recognize a deferred tax liability related to inventory, equal to
the LIFO reserve multiplied by the appropriate corporate tax rate, when valuing a
LIFO firm's net assets. Technically, this deferred tax liability would arise because
investors, by converting inventory to as-if FIFO, are implicitly assuming that a firm
uses FIFO for financial reporting purposes and LIFO for tax purposes.^ More
intuitively, this deferred tax liability would exist because the use of LIFO results
in a temporary deferral of taxes relative to the use of FIFO that reverses when
LIFO layers are liquidated.^
To surrmiarize, we expect that after adjusting inventory to as-if FIFO, investors
estimate a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden as its LIFO reserve multiplied
by the appropriate corporate tax rate, and then include this tax-adjusted LIFO
reserve in the valuation of a LIFO firm's net assets. In this scenario, the tax-
adjusted LIFO reserve is, in effect, an estimate of an off-balance-sheet deferred tax
liability. As a result, we predict a negative association between the tax-adjusted
LIFO reserve and market value of equity. Throughout the paper, we refer to this
as the deferred tax explanation of the negative association between the LIFO
reserve and market value of equity.
The results of our tests support the deferred tax explanation. Specifically, after
adjusting inventory to as-if FIFO and calculating the deferred tax liability
associated with this adjustment (equal to the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve), we
document that the association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market
value of equity is negative and that this association is less negative in the years
following the passage of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). This latter
result is consistent with the deferred tax explanation because the decrease in tax
rates mandated by TRA 86 reduced the real value of the deferred tax liability
proxied by the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve.
We also find that in tests of the association of the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve
and deferred tax liability with market value of equity, (1) the response to TRA 86
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of the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve/market value of equity association is similar to
that of the deferred tax liability/market value of equity association; and (2) the
estimated coefficients on the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and the deferred tax
liability are similar. The fact that the association of the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve
and deferred tax liability with market value of equity each became less negative in
post-TRA 86 years, in conjunction with the similarity of the magnitude of the tax-
adjusted LIFO reserve and deferred tax liability coefficients, provides additional
support for the deferred tax explanation.
The primary contribution of this paper is that it helps to explain the ex ante
unexpected negative association between the LIFO reserve and market value of
equity. This contribution is important for several reasons. First, our results clarify
the nature of the information provided by an important footnote disclosure, the
LIFO reserve. In addition, our results provide evidence on whether investors view
deferred taxes as real liabilities." Finally, our tests examine how the association of
the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and deferred tax liability with market value of equity
changed in response to the decrease in tax rates mandated by TRA 86, which al-
lows us to provide indirect evidence on the sensitivity of equity value to tax rate
changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes sample selection;
section 3 discusses models and test design and reports test results; and section 4
concludes the paper with a brief summary and a discussion of its major findings.
2. Sample selection
Data are from COMPUSTAT primary, supplementary, tertiary, full coverage, and
research files and from files of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
The years covered are 1975, the first year for which COMPUSTAT reports LIFO
reserve data, through 1994, the last year for which all required data items are
available. The sample is limited to firm years that report LIFO as their primary
method of accounting for inventory because the LIFO reserve should be an
important consideration for these firms. We reduced the initial sample of 20,894
firm-years to 11,617 firm-years after removing 7,881 firm-years with missing data,
849 firm-years that do not fall in pre-TRA 86 or fully phased in post-TRA 86 years
(as defined below), and 547 firm-years with a test variable whose value falls in the
top percentile of the distribution for that test variable.^
Table 1 summarizes descriptive data for the sample. The percentage of obser-
vations falling in a given year ranges from 2.6 percent in 1975 to 6.9 percent in
1983, and 62.2 percent of observations occur in pre-TRA 86 years. In addition, the
median of inventory as a percentage of total assets ranges from 18.5 percent in
1994 to 27.2 percent in 1979, the range in the median of the LIFO reserve as a
percentage of total assets is from 2.8 percent in 1994 to 7.2 percent in 1981; and
the median of the LIFO reserve as a percentage of owners' equity ranges from 6.1
percent in 1994 to 14.3 percent in 1981 .* These percentages suggest that inventory
and the LIFO reserve are important considerations for the firms in our sample.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive data for the sample
Year
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
Total
N
511
516
530
538
565
583
623
528
735
767
796
792
772
747
698
640
573
403
300
11,617
INV/
ASSETS
18.5%
19.2
19.9
20.0
21.0
21.9
22.8
21.3
23.7
23.7
22.6
24.1
25.6
26.5
27.2
26.2
26.5
25.9
25.0
RES/
ASSETS
2.8%
3.0
3.1
3.5
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.8
4.7
5.7
6.3
7.0
7.2
7.1
6.7
6.0
5.9
5.6
5.6
RES/OE
6.1%
6.5
6.7
7.3
8.2
8.8
8.4
7.6
9.7
11.2
12.2
14.1
14.3
14.2
14.0
12.1
11.3
10.8
U.O
Notes:
Data are from COMPUSTAT primary, supplementary, tertiary, full coverage, and research
files and from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files. The years covered
are 1975 through 1994. The initial sample of 20,894 firm-years that report LIFO as their
primary method of accounting for inventory is reduced to 11,617 firm-years after
removing 7,881 firm years with missing data, 849 firm years that do not fall in pre-TRA
86 or fully phased in post-TRA 86 years, and 547 firm-years with a test variable whose
value falls in the top percentile of the distribution for that test variable. For each year, the
table presents the number of observations in the sample, the median of inventory as a
percentage of total assets (INV/ASSETS), the median of the LIFO reserve as a percentage
of total assets (RES/ASSETS), and the median of the LIFO reserve as a percentage of
owners' equity (RES/OE).
3. Model, test design, and results
Tests that use all years
As discussed earlier, we expect that when investors value a LIFO firm's net assets,
they adjust LIFO inventory to as-if FIFO because, relative to LIFO cost, FIFO cost
is closer to replacement cost. We also expect that, conditional on adjusting
inventory to as-if FIFO, investors estimate a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax
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burden as its LIFO reserve multiplied by the appropriate corporate tax rate, and
then include this tax-adjusted LIFO reserve in the valuation of a LIFO firm's net
assets. In this scenario, the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve is, in effect, an estimate of
an off-balance-sheet deferred tax liability and, as a result, we predict a negative
association between a firm's tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and the market value of its
equity. As an initial test of this argument, we estimate the following model across
firms in each of the 19 sample years (predicted signs for model coefficients are in
brackets):
I
A^^,,= ao+ nASSETS,,+ Y:^NV,,+ r^UAB.,+ nRESV-, + f,,
[+] W [-] [-] (1)
where i is firm i and t is the current (fiscal) year; MV is the market value of com-
mon equity at the end of the fourth month following the end of year f; ASSETS is
the book value of assets other than inventory at the end of year /; INV is as-if FIFO
inventory at the end of year t; UAB is the book value of liabilities plus preferred
stock at the end of year t; and RESV is the LIFO reserve reduced to a deferred tax
amount at the end of year t. To reduce size effects, elements of the data matrix are
deflated by shares of common stock outstanding.
In the model, MV is measured four months after the end of the year on the
assumption that investors will have analyzed a firm's annual financial statements
by this time. Inventory is stated at as-if FIFO to account for our expectation that
I investors adjust LIFO inventory to as-if FIFO. The LIFO reserve is reduced to a
deferred tax amount (as described next) to reflect our expectation that, conditional
on adjusting inventory to as-if FIFO, investors view the LIFO reserve reduced to
a deferred tax amount as an indicator of a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax
burden.'
The tax-adjusted LIFO reserve (RESV) is computed using the Accounting
Principles Board's Opinion no. 11 (APB 11 1967) rules.* We begin by multiplying
the 1975 LIFO reserve by the 1975 maximum corporate tax rate. In each suc-
ceeding year, we multiply the annual change in the LIFO reserve by that year's
maximum corporate tax rate and use the resulting number to adjust the previous
year's tax-adjusted LIFO reserve.'
In estimates of the model represented by equation 1, the coefficients on
\ASSETS and INV are expected to be positive and the coefficients on LIAB and
RESV are expected to be negative. As reported in Table 2, the mean of the 19
estimated coefficients on each regression variable is in the predicted direction and
'significant at less than the 0.01 one-tail level. These results provide preliminary
levidence consistent with our deferred tax explanation of the negative association
jbetween the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity.
^ that compare pre-TRA 86 wUh post-TRA 86 years
TRA 86 reduced the maximum corporate tax rate, over a two-year period, from 46
percent to 34 percent. Assuming that taxes are paid at the maximum marginal rate
TABLE 2
Estimation of MV,, =
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+ «•,,
Maximum estimate
Median estimate
Minimum estimate
Mean estimate
1.49
1.12*
0.94
1.15*
1.64
1.06*
0.77
1.13*
-0.80
-1.05*
-1.50
-1.07*
1.09
-0.73*
-2.99
-0.93*
Notes:
* Mean (median) differs from zero in the predicted direction at less than the 0.01 one-tail
significance level
The sample consists of the 11,617 firm-years described in the notes to Table l.The model is
estimated across firms in each of 19 sample years. In the model:
MV = the market value of common equity at the end of the fourth month following the end of
the current year.
ASSETS = the book value of assets other than inventory at the end of the current year.
INV = the book value of as-if FIFO inventory at the end of the current year.
UAB = the book value of liabilities plus preferred stock at the end of the current year.
RESV = the LIFO reserve reduced to a deferred tax amount at the end of the current year.
All elements of the data matrix are deflated by shares of common stock outstanding at the end
of the current year. In the columns headed Y„, descriptive statistics for Y„ in the 19
regressions are reported.
over time, this decrease in rates would reduce the real value of the deferred tax
liability approximated by the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve because this liability would
eventually be settled at 34 percent rather than at 46 percent. Asa result, if investors
view the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve as an indicator of a firm's future LIFO
liquidation tax burden, then the coefficient on RESV should be less negative in
post-TRA 86 estimates of equation 1.'"
To test the preceding prediction, we estimate equation 1 across firms in each
of 11 pre-TRA 86 years as well as across firms in each of 8 post-TRA 86 years. We
define pre-TRA 86 years as years for which MV is measured before TRA 86's
enactment date (i.e., pre-TRA 86 years are fiscal years ending before June 1986)."
Post-TRA 86 years are years for which future LIFO liquidations would be subject
to a maximum tax rate of 34 percent (i.e., post-TRA 86 years are fiscal years end-
ing after May 1987). On the basis of these definitions, only 151 January-to-May
firms, before data screens, are available to estimate models in 1986. Since it is
difficult to draw inferences using this small sample, we do not estimate models in
1986.
As can be seen in panel A of Table 3, the mean of the coefficients on RESV in
the 8 post-TRA 86 estimates of equation 1 is less negative than the mean of the
coefficients on RESV in the 11 pre-TRA 86 estimates at the 0.078 one-tail
significance level. This result is consistent with the argument that the negative
association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity
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TABLE 3
Estimation of MV;, =
Panel A: Estimation through y^
URESV)
Pre- Post-
TRA TRA
86 86
years years Sig.
Maximum estimate 0.04 1.09
Median estimate -1.28 -0.28 0.074
Minimum estimate -2.92 -2.99
Mean estimate -1.26 -0.47 0.078
Panel B: Estimation of full
Maximum estimate
Median estimate
Minimum estimate
Mean estimate
)
Pre-
TRA
86
years
-0.17
-0.89
-3.00
-1.23
Panel C: Estimation of full
Maximum estimate
Median estimate
Minimum estimate
Mean estimate
Pre-
TRA
86
years
1.40
1.13
0.91
1.13
model: Results for RESV, DTL,
'^(RESV)
Post-
TRA
86
years Sig.
1.04
-0.51 0.151
-2.81
-0.58 0.115
model: Results
Post-
TRA
86
years Sig.
1.37
1.12 0.966
0.94
1.12 0.986
Pre-
TRA
86
years
-0.03
-0.79
-3.18
-1.13
Y^{DTL)
Post-
TRA
86
years
0.71
-0.11
-1.41
-0.27
mAABIL*RESV
Sig.
0.021
0.020
Yf,(ABIL*RESV)
All
years
0.88
0.11
-0.23
0.21
foT ASSETS, INV, and UAB
Pre-
TRA
86
years
1.65
1.07
0.79
1.14
Post-
TRA
86
years
1.40
1.07
0.85
1.10
Sig.
0.976
0.750
Pre-
TRA
86
years
-0.91
-1.19
-1.46
-1.16
Sig.
0.027
0.009
Y^iUAB)
Post-
TRA
86
years Sig.
-0.77
-0.88 0.001
-1.05
-0.90 0.001
Notes:
The sample consists of the 11,617 firm-years described in the notes to Table 1. The model is
estimated across firms in each of 11 pre-TRA 86 years and 8 post-TRA 86 years. In panel
A:
MV = market value of common equity at the end of the fourth month following the
end of year r.
ASSETS = book value of assets other than inventory at the end of year /.
INV = book value of as-if FIFO inventory at the end of year /.
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TABLE 3 (continued)
UAB
RESV
In panels B and C:
MV, ASSETS, INV, and RESV
UAB
book value of liabilities plus preferred stock at the end
of year t.
LIFO reserve reduced to a deferred tax amount at the
end of year (.
as defined in panel A.
book value of liabilities, other than deferred tax liabil-
ity, plus preferred stock at the end of year year t.
DTL = defeiTed tax liability at the end of year year /.
ABIVRESV = thecorrelationacross the study period between a firm's
yearly gross profit as a percentage of sales and the
year-end Consumers' Price Index level interacted
with the gross LIFO reserve.
All elements of the data matrix are deflated by shares of common stock outstanding at the end
of the year (.
In the columns headed yx,...,Yi (1) descriptive statistics for /p...,^'5 in the 11 pre-TRA 86
regressions and in he 8 post-TRA 86 regressions are reported; and (2) the "Sig." column
reports the one-tail significance level of a t-test of the difference in means (of a rank-sum
test) that tests the alternative hypothesis that the mean (median) coefficient in the 8 post-
TRA 86 estimates of the model is less negative than the mean (median) coefficient in the
11 pre-TRA 86 estimates of the model. In the colunm headed j'g, (1) descriptive statistics
for Yi in all 19 regressions are reported; and (2) the "Sig." column reports the one-tail
significance level of a <-test (of a sign-rank test) that tests the alternative hypothesis that
mean (median) Yt is greater than zero in the 19 estimates of the model.
refiects the fact that investors view the LIFO reserve reduced to a deferred tax
amount as an indicator of a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden.
In post-TRA 86 years, maximum corporate tax rates decreased from 46 percent
to 34 percent, which suggests that, ceteris paribus the estimated coefficient on
RESV should decline by at most 26 percent in post-TRA 86 years (i.e., [46 -
34]/46). However, the actual decline observed in Table 3 is much more than 26
percent. We have no explanation for this result. However, we do point out that in
tests of the association between a firm's deferred tax liability and the market value
of its equity reported in the following section, the post-TRA 86 decline in the
estimated coefficient on the deferred tax liability is also much more than 26
percent. Moreover, as reported later, there is a 22.4 percent decline in the estimated
coefficient on LIAB from the pre-TRA 86 period to the post-TRA 86 period, which
suggests that there may have been a post-TRA 86 structural shift in the valuation
of all liabilities that helps to explain why the post-TRA 86 decline in the estimated
coefficients on RESVanA the deferred tax liability is greater than 26 percent.'^
Tests that use an augmented model
In this section, we report the results of tests that augment equation 1 with (1) a
firm's deferred tax liability balance; and (2) a proxy for the price-elasticity
argument, which is described in detail later. The deferred tax liability balance is
added to equation 1 because this allows us to compare the tax-adjusted LIFO
reserve/market value of equity association with the deferred tax liability/market
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value of equity association. If these associations are similar, we will interpret this
as additional support for the deferred tax explanation of the negative association
between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity. A proxy for the
price-elasticity argument is added to equation 1 to account for the price-elasticity
explanation as to why there is a negative association between the LEFO reserve and
market value of equity.
The specific model estimated in this section is as follows:
W W [-] [-] [-]
(2)
e-,
where MV, ASSETS, INV, and RESV are defined as in equation 1, LIAB is LIAB in
equation 1 other than DTL, DTL is the deferred tax liability at the end of the current
year deflated by shares of common stock outstanding, and ABIL*RESV is a
measure of ability to pass on input price increases interacted with the gross LIFO
reserve deflated by shares of common stock outstanding.
Previous research" finds that investors view deferred taxes as a real liability.
On the basis of this research, in estimates of equation 2, the coefficient on DTL is
expected to be negative.
Furthermore, under the provisions of APB 11, which was in effect when TRA
86 was enacted into law, a firm would not adjust its deferred tax liability to account
for the reduction of tax rates mandated by TRA 86. For this reason, after the
passage of TRA 86, the portion of a firm's deferred tax liability that was
established prior to TRA 86 using a 46 percent tax rate would overstate the taxes
that would result from the eventual settlement of the deferred tax liability at 34
percent. As a result of this post-TRA 86 overstatement, the DTL coefficient is
expected to be less negative in post-TRA 86 estimates of equation 2.
Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings et al. (1996) develop a price-
elasticity argument that they use to interpret the negative association between the
LIFO reserve and market value of equity. This argument states that, conditional on
the LIFO reserve providing information to investors about a firm's future input
price increases,'" a negative (non-negative) association between the LIFO reserve
and market value of equity is consistent with the conclusion that investors expect
that firms on average cannot (can) raise output prices at least dollar for dollar in
response to input price increases. In their empirical analysis, Guenther and
Trombley and Jennings et al. observe a negative association between the LIFO
reserve and market value of equity, and a less negative association for firms that
are better able to pass on input price increases to their customers. On the basis of
price-elasticity argument, these results are interpreted as consistent with the
conclusion that investors expect that firms on average are unable to raise prices at
least dollar for dollar in response to input price increases.
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To account for the price-elasticity argument, equation 2 includes a variable,
ABIL*RESV, that measures a firm's ability to pass on input price increases after
controlling for the size of its LIFO reserve. Ability to pass on input price increases,
ABIL, is proxied by a measure used in Jennings et al. (1996). Specifically, ABIL is
equal to the correlation across the study period between a firm's yearly gross profit
as a percentage of sales and the year-end level of the Consumers' Price Index, with
a higher (i.e., more positive) ABIL reflecting a greater ability to pass on input price
increases.'^ On the basis of the evidence in Guenther and Trombley (1994) and
Jennings et al., the coefficient on ABIL*RESV is expected to be positive in
estimates of equation 2.
The results of estimating equation 2 across firms in each sample year are
summarized in panel B of Table 3. As before, the mean of the post-TRA 86 es-
timated coefficients on RESV is less negative than the mean of the pre-TRA 86
estimated coefficients (0.115 one-tail significance level). Regarding this marginal
result, we later show that, as predicted, the difference between post-TRA 86 and
pre-TRA 86 estimated RESV coefficients is more significant when we narrow the
test window surrounding TRA 86.
The estimated coefficient on DTL is generally negative and the mean of the
post-TRA 86 estimated coefficients on DTL is less negative than the mean of the
pre-TRA 86 estimated coefficients (0.020 one-tail significance level). Moreover,
the DTL coefficient does not differ from the RESV cotffidtni at the 0.05 two-tail
significance level in 12 of 19 estimates of equation 2 and the mean of the 19
estimated DTL coefficients does not differ from the mean of the 19 estimated RESV
coefficients at conventional significance levels (two-tail p-value is 0.532). The
similarity of the magnitude of the estimated RESV and DTL coefficients, in
conjunction with the similarity of the response to TRA 86 of the tax-adjusted LIFO
reserve/market value of equity association and the deferred tax liability/market
value of equity association, provides additional support for the deferred tax
explanation of the negative association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and
market value of equity.
The mean of the 19 estimated coefficients on ABIL*RESV is positive (0.009
one-tail significance level). On the basis of the price-elasticity argument and
consistent with previous research, this result suggests that investors expect that
firms on average cannot raise output prices at least dollar for dollar in response to
input price increases.'*
Tests for a post-TRA 86 structural shift in valuations
It is possible that there was a structural shift in the valuation of assets and liabilities
in the post-TRA 86 period that is related to factors not included in our models.
Such a structural shift could explain the results for RESV and DTL reported to this
point. To provide evidence whether a structural valuation shift did occur in the
post-TRA 86 period, we examine the post-TRA 86 behavior of the coefficients on
ASSETS, INV, and LIAB in estimates of equation 2. If only the coefficients on
RESV and DTL exhibit the post-TRA 86 behavior documented earlier, this would
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provide evidence that our results are not well explained by a post-TRA 86
structural valuation shift.
As seen in panel C of Table 3, the mean of the post-TRA 86 estimated co-
efficients on ASSETS and INV do not differ fi-om the mean of the pre-TRA 86
estimated coefficients at conventional significance levels. However, the mean of
the post-TRA 86 estimated coefficients on LIAB is less negative than the mean
of the pre-TRA 86 estimated coefficients at the 0.001 two-tail significance level.
This latter result suggests that there may have been a structural shift in the
valuation of liabilities that caused all types of liabilities, including RESV and DTL,
to have a less negative association with market value of equity in post-TRA 86
years. However, the post-TRA 86 decrease in the estimated coefficient on UAB is
much smaller in magnitude than the post-TRA 86 decrease in the estimated
coefficients on RESV and DTL, which suggests that the TRA 86 decrease in tax
rates did have a separate, additional impact on RESV and DTL that it did not have
on UAB.
The results reported in this section provide indirect evidence on the sensitivity
of equity value to tax rate changes. Specifically, the results indicate that the asso-
ciation of RESV and DTL with MV each became less negative in post-TRA 86
years. Furthermore, this reaction to TRA 86 is insignificant or less pronounced for
ASSETS, INV, and UAB. Since a less negative association between a given variable
and Af y in response to the reduction of tax rates mandated by TRA 86 is predicted
only for the variables RESV and DTL, these results provide indirect evidence that
equity value is sensitive to changes in tax rates.
Tests that use narrower windows around TRA 86
The results reported to this point are based on comparing the mean of the estimated
coefficients on RESV and DTL in all pre-TRA 86 years (i.e., 1975 to 1985) with the
mean of the estimated coefficients on RESV and DTL in all post-TRA 86 years (i.e.,
1987 to 1994). If we narrow the test window around TRA 86, our results should be
stronger for the following reason. After the passage of TRA 86, it is the portion of
a firm's tax-adjusted LIFO reserve (deferred tax liability) that was established prior
to TRA 86 that overstates the taxes that would result from the eventual liquidation
of the LIFO reserve (settlement of the deferred tax liability) at 34 percent. Since
this pre-TRA 86 portion decays as a firm liquidates LIFO layers (settles deferred
tax liabilities), the hypothesis that the RESV {DTL) coefficient is less negative in
post-TRA 86 estimates of equation 2 should receive stronger support in the years
immediately surrounding TRA 86. An additional reason that this hypothesis should
receive stronger support in the years immediately surrounding TRA 86 is that test
data are less likely to be "contaminated" by firms that adopted SFAS 96 or SFAS
109 during the sample period."
Our narrow-window tests are conducted using the two (three; four) years
falling before and after the passage of TRA 86. As expected, test results are
stronger using these narrower windows. Specifically, using the two- (three-; four-)
year window, the mean of RESV and DTL coefficients in post-TRA 86 estimates
of equation 2 are less negative than the mean of/?£5Vand DTL coefficients in pre-
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TRA 86 estimates at the 0.025 and 0.021 (0.001 and 0.005; 0.049 and 0.003) one-
tail significance levels, respectively.
Tests that account for changes in inflationary expectations
Inflationary expectations should have been lower in the post-TRA 86 period. For
example, on the basis of data reported in Statistical Abstracts of the United States,
the annual percentage change in the Consumers' Price Index exceeds 9.0 (5.5)
percent in 4 (8) of 11 pre-TRA 86 years and it never exceeds 5.5 percent in any
post-TRA 86 year. If susceptibility to inflation reduces market value of equity and
if the RESV coefficient reflects susceptibility to inflation, then an alternative
explanation for the post-TRA 86 decline in the /?£5V coefficient is that there was
a reduction of inflationary expectations in the post-TRA 86 period."
To explore this issue, we estimate equation 2 using only years in which the
annual percentage change in the Consumers' Price Index (ACPI) is relatively low.
On the basis of on an inspection of the CPI time series from 1975 to 1994, we
defme low-ACPI years as 1983 to 1994, with qualitatively similar results obtained
using altemative definitions of low-ACPI years. In low-ACPl estimates of equation
2, the mean of the post-TRA 86 coefficients on RESV is less negative than the
mean of the pre-TRA 86 coefficients at the 0.004 one-tail significance level. Since
only low-ACPI years are used in these tests, this result suggests that reduced post-
TRA 86 inflationary expectations do not explain the post-TRA 86 decline in the
/?£5V coefficient.
Tests that use an altemative valuation model
This section reports the results of estimating a valuation model that includes a
firm's eamings less net dividends as an independent variable. The reason for this
additional analysis is as follows. It seems reasonable that a firm's eamings are
correlated with its ability to pass on input price increases. For example, a firm that
is relatively unsuccessful at passing on input price increases should have relatively
lower eamings. Since eamings less net dividends are an important factor for
valuing a firm's equity (see, e.g., Ohlson 1995), this raises the possibility that the
negative association between the LIFO reserve and market value of equity, to the
extent that it refiects inability to pass on input price increases, is actually refiective
of the correlated omitted variable eamings less net dividends." To explore this
issue, we estimate the following model:^"
= «o + YMEBEXT., - DIVi,)) + y2BVCE,, + y^RESV^, + e,_, (3)
where MV and RESV are defined as in equation 1, <|) is (1 + /?/)//?/where Rf is the
average annual retum on 30-day Treasury securities, EBEXTis net income before
extraordinary items per share, DIV is dividends net of new capital contributions per
share, and BVCE is the book value of common equity (with inventory stated at as-if
FIFO) per share.
In estimates of equation 3, the mean of the coefficients on RESV in the 8 post-
TRA 86 estimates is less negative than the mean of the coefficients on RESV in the
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11 pre-TRA 86 estimates at the 0.043 one-tail significance level.^' Assuming that
earnings less net dividends captures a firm's ability to pass on input price increases,
this result provides additional support for the deferred tax explanation of the nega-
tive association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity.
4. Summary
Recent research by Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings et al. (1996)
documents a negative association between a firm's LIFO reserve and the market
value of its equity. This study tests a deferred tax explanation of this negative
association. Specifically, we argue that investors, conditional on adjusting
inventory to as-if FIFO, estimate a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden as its
LIFO reserve multiplied by the appropriate corporate tax rate, and then include this
tax-adjusted LIFO reserve in the valuation of a LIFO firm's net assets. On the basis
of this argument, the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve is in effect an estimate of an off-
balance-sheet deferred tax liability and, as a result, we predict a negative
association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity.
The results of our tests support the deferred tax explanation. In particular, we
find that the association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value
of equity is negative and that this association is less negative after the passage of
TRA 86. This latter result is consistent with the deferred tax explanation because
the decrease in tax rates mandated by TRA 86 reduced the real value of the
deferred tax liability proxied by the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve. We also find that
in tests of the association of the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and deferred tax liability
with market value of equity, (1) the response to TRA 86 of the tax-adjusted LIFO
reserve/market value of equity association is similar to that of the deferred tax
liability/market value of equity association; and (2) the magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients on the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and the deferred tax liability are
similar.
The results of this paper provide several insights for financial analysts and for
the financial statement analysis literature. First, this paper provides evidence
consistent with the conclusion that disclosure of the LIFO reserve is useful because
it provides information about a firm's tax burden. Second, consistent with previous
research (e.g., Givoly and Hayn 1992; Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willars 1997;
Sansing 1997; Cheung, Krishnan, and Min 1997), the results of this paper provide
evidence that investors view deferred taxes as real liabilities that reduce a firm's
market value of equity. Finally, our results provide indirect evidence that equity
value is sensitive to changes in tax rates.
Endnotes
1. The LIFO reserve, a required disclosure for LIFO firms, is the difference between
inventory at the lower of LIFO cost and market and inventory at either (1) the lower
of cost determined by some acceptable non-LIFO inventory accounting method,
such as FIFO, and market; or (2) replacement cost. For expositional clarity, we
assume that lower of FIFO cost and market is the non-LIFO inventory method used
to compute the LIFO reserve.
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2. In reality, if a firm uses LIFO for tax purposes, it must also use LIFO for financial
reporting purposes (Internal Revenue Code sections 472(c) and 474(e)). However,
this LIFO conformity rule would not prevent investors from converting a LIFO
firm's balance sheet to as-if FIFO when valuing a LIFO firm's net assets.
3. This discussion assumes inflation in a firm's input prices. The deferred tax liability
described here is often referred to as a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden.
4. Previous evidence that investors regard deferred taxes as a real liability includes
Givoly and Hayn (1992) and Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997), who find
that a firm's deferred tax liability is negatively associated with its equity value; the
analytical model of Sansing (1997) in which deferred taxes are shown to be a real
economic liability of the firm; and Cheung, Krishnan, and Min (1997, 14), who find
"that consideration of deferred tax information leads to superior forecasts of future
tax payments and that deferred tax data enhance prediction of future cash fiows".
5. Qualitatively similar results are obtained using alternate definitions of outliers based
on the diagnostic tests of Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).
6. As noted in Jennings et al. 1996, the magnitude of the LIFO reserve is positively
associated with inflation. The generally declining trend over time in the magnitude
of the LIFO reserve observed in Table 1 likely refiects the generally declining trend
in infiation over our test period.
7. In equation 1, INV (RESV) is analogous to FIXED (DTL) in the model MV =
ASSETS + FIXED + UAB + DTL, where MV is market value of equity, ASSETS are
assets other than FIXED, FIXED are depreciable assets, UAB are liabilities other
than DTL, and DTL is deferred tax liability related to depreciation. Note that DTL in
this model (and RESV in equation 1) is expected to reduce AfV because DTL
captures a firm's future tax burden. However, DTL also captures taxes saved in the
past by taking larger-than-book tax deductions. As a result of this latter factor, firms
with a larger DTL would be expected to have a larger MV. This relationship is
captured in the model by ASSETS or UAB because firms with a larger DTL would
have a larger cash balance (or, if cash were used to pay down debt, a smaller debt
balance; or, if cash were used to buy an asset, a larger asset balance; etc.) due to
taxes saved in the past.
Equation 1 is similar to equation 6 in Jennings et al. 1996. However, in
equation 1, inventory is stated at as-if FIFO and the LIFO reserve is reduced to a
deferred tax amount.
8. APB 11 rules are used for two reasons. First, these rules were in effect when TRA
86 was enacted into law. Second, the use of APB 11 rules allows a more direct
comparison of the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve with the deferred tax liability (DTL)
recognized on a firm's balance sheet. When a firm adopts SFAS 109 (FASB 1992),
it adjusts its entire DTL to refiect expected DTL settlement rates. SFAS 109
required adoption for fiscal years starting after December 15, 1992. As a sensitivity
test, we adjust the LIFO reserve using SFAS 109 rules from 1992 to 1994, with
similar results. We do not attempt to adjust the LIFO reserve using SFAS 96 (FASB
1987) rules because evidence in Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) suggests that many
firms did not adopt SFAS 96 (i.e., they moved directly from APB 11 to SFAS 109).
9. For example, assume that a firm's LIFO reserve is $100 at the end of 1981, its tax-
adjusted LIFO reserve at the end of 1981 is $46, and its LIFO reserve at the end of
1982 is $90 [$130]. The maximum corporate tax rate for 1982 is 46 percent. The
firm's tax-adjusted LIFO reserve at the end of 1982 would be $41.40 ($46 - $10 x
.46) [$59.80 ($46 + $30 x .46)].
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10. RESV is computed using APB 11 rules. Under APB 11, a firm would not adjust
its deferred tax liability to account for the reduction of tax rates mandated by TRA
86. Thus, in post-TRA 86 years the portion of RESV that was established prior to
TRA 86 using a 46 percent tax rate would overstate the taxes that would result
from the eventual liquidation of the LIFO reserve at 34 percent. As a result of this
post-TRA 86 overstatement, the RESV coefficient is expected to be less negative in
post-TRA 86 years.
11. As described in Givoly and Hayn (1992, 398-9), "Discussions and proposals
pertaining to tax refonn appear to have begun in September, 1984.... Subsequently,
the pace of events leading to tax reform accelerated rapidly in 1985 and 1986." If
firms' market value of equity began to respond to the implications of TRA 86 as
early as September 1984, then the classification of years for which MV'is measured
between September 1984 and TRA 86's enactment date as pre-TRA 86 years makes
it more difficult to find support for the deferred tax explanation.
12. As discussed later, such a structural shift would not explain the entire post-TRA 86
decline in the estimated coefficients on RESV and the deferred tax liability, because
the post-TRA 86 decline in the estimated coefficient on LIAB is much smaller in
magnitude than the post-TRA 86 decline in the estimated coefficients on RESV and
the deferred tax liability.
13. Summarized in note 4, supra.
14. The price-elasticity argument holds as long as the LIFO reserve is at least associated
with the information used by investors to infer a firm's future input price increases.
That is, the price-elasticity argument could hold even if investors do not use the
LIFO reserve itself to make inferences about a firm's future input price increases.
For this reason, the price-elasticity argument does not necessarily imply that the
LIFO reserve itself is value relevant. We thank a referee for pointing this out to us.
15. In constructing ABIL, we require that a firm have at least five years of gross profit
data.
16. A referee pointed out that given inflation in input prices, gross profit (and thus MV)
should be greater, the greater are days-inventory-on-hand (DAYSINV). The intuition
of this argument is that an older, lower-priced unit of inventory would be reported
as cost of goods sold, the greater are DAYSINV. When we augment equation 2 with
DAYSINV*RESV, this argument is supported at the 0.012 one-tail significance level
and other test results are very similar to those reported here.
17. See note 8, supra.
18. Inflation reduces market value of equity if a firm cannot raise prices at a rate ex-
ceeding the inflation rate of input prices (Damodaran 1996). Given the evidence in
Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings et al. (1996) suggesting that firms are
unable to raise prices at least dollar for dollar in response to input price increases, it
seems prudent to examine this explanation of our results.
19. We thank a referee for drawing our attention to this point. Also, as pointed out by
this same referee, the inclusion of the potential correlated omitted variable
^(EBEXTi^ - DfVii) in equation 3 below may introduce multicoUineadty problems.
We test for multicoUinearity using condition indices (Belsley et al. 1980). No
condition index exceeds 14. On the basis of the rule of thumb that a condition index
exceeding 30 indicates strong coUinearity (Kennedy 1992), we conclude that
multicoUinearity is not a serious problem in estimates of equation 3.
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20. We thank a referee for suggesting that we estimate this model. Equation 3 is similar
to equation 2 in Guenther and Trombley (1994). However, in equation 3 BVCE is
based on inventory stated at as-if FIFO and RESV is reduced to a deferred tax
amount.
21. When we include DTL in equation 3, the mean of the post-TRA 86 estimated
coefficients on RESV (DTL) is less negative than the mean of the pre-TRA 86
estimated coefficients at the 0.016 (0.001) one-tail significance level. Also, similar
test results are obtained if the term ^EBEXT^, - DIV^, is replaced with the term
EBEXT^,, EBEXTi, - DN^,, EBEXT^, - cash dividends,-,, or ^EBEXT;, - cash
dividends,.,.
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